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Abstract The relationship between voter turnout and individual-level determinants are 
well known.  So is the ongoing decline in turnout over time.  Yet political participation is 
also shaped by local factors and election contexts.  This is certainly true across the 
Canadian provinces, where there has been a broad spectrum of turnout levels ranging from 
Prince Edward Island at the top to Alberta at the bottom.  Using data on all 134 provincial 
elections from 1965 to 2014, we find three additional core determinants of voter turnout 
across the provinces:  the competitiveness and multipartism of their elections, the 
embeddedness (local identification) of their populations, and the progressiveness of their 
electorates. 
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Résumé Les relations entre la participation électorale et au niveau individuel déterminants 
sont bien connus.  Ainsi est la baisse continue du taux de participation au fil du temps.  
Pourtant, la participation politique est également façonnée par des facteurs locaux et des 
contextes électoraux.  C’est certainement vrai à travers les provinces canadiennes, où il y a 
eu un large éventail de niveaux de participation allant de l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard au 
sommet à l’Alberta au fond.  En utilisant des données sur les 134 élections provinciales de 
1965 à 2014, on trouve trois déterminants de base supplémentaires de la participation 
électorale à travers les provinces: la compétitivé et le multipartisme de leurs élections, 
l’enracinement (identification locale) de leurs populations, et la progressivité de leurs 
électorats. 
 
Mots-clés: le taux de participation’ la compétitivité;  le changement de gouvernement;  
l’identification locale;  le gauchisme 
 
  





 As in countries throughout the 
world, voter participation is at an all-time 
low throughout most of Canada.  Using 
nationwide surveys, analysts have linked 
turnout to a variety of individual factors, 
ranging from one’s age, gender, income, 
race, or religion, to one’s level of interest, 
trust, knowledge, civic duty, or sense of 
efficacy in politics (see: Gidengil et al., 
2004: 108-116; Blais et al., 2002: ch. 3; 
Nevitte et al., 2000: ch. 5; Pammett, 1991; 
Pammett and LeDuc, 2003; Rubenson et 
al., 2007; LeDuc and Pammett, 2006; 
Archer and Wesley, 2006).  Yet, two 
important elements are missing from 
these accounts.  The first is the sense that 
context matters – that environmental 
factors have as much of an effect on a 
community’s level of electoral 
participation as its residents’ personal 
attributes and attitudes.  Just as there are 
certain types of people who are less likely 
to vote, so too are there less participatory 
communities and societies.  However, 
Canadian analysts have often ignored 
geographic variations in voter turnout.  
This leads to the second shortcoming of 
existing research on turnout in Canada, 
namely that it focuses heavily on federal, 
versus provincial, politics (but see: 
Wesley, 2010; BC Stats, 2005; Leger 
Marketing, 2008; BC Stats, 2009; Studlar, 
2001; PRA, 2004, 2008).  These two 
shortcomings are related, in that 
addressing the gaps in sub-national 
research would improve our 
understanding of how context matters.   
Taking up this challenge, the 
following analysis uncovers two leading 
determinants of voter turnout in the 
Canadian provinces:  the competitiveness 
of their elections and the 
“progressiveness” of their electorates.  
Using an original database on turnout in 
134 provincial elections from 1965 to 
2014, the study confirms that turnout has 
declined over time, but moreover reveals 
that turnout is higher: (1) given certain 
election-specific contexts (where the 
competition is between two main parties 
that are close in vote support and that 
monopolize the seats between them, 
where the election leads to a change in 
government, and intriguingly where the 
overall result is more disproportionate); 
and (2) given certain broader provincial 
contexts (where the population is more 
rural, has a higher proportion of people 
born in the province, and has a lower 
proportion of Aboriginal peoples, and 
where the share of the vote for left-
leaning parties and the rate of 
unionization are higher).   These results 
confirm that ‘context matters’ when 
explaining variation in voter turnout, and 
suggest that each province constitutes its 
own unique political system with its own 
distinct electorate and set of competitive 
dynamics.  More than simply an 
individual act, non-voting in Canada 
appears to have community-level 
determinants that require further study. 
The strong, positive relationship between 
competitiveness and turnout in Canada 
should come as little surprise to 
researchers in other parts of the world.   
Indeed, the maxim, ‘the closer the 
election, the higher its turnout’ has long 
enjoyed law-like status in the discipline 
(Gray, 1976: 153) (Gronlund, 2004; Blais, 
2006; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; 
Aistrup, 1993; Agasoster, 2001; Bonjean 
and Lineberry, 1970; Jenkins, Schickler, 
and Carson, 2004; Holbrook and Van 
Dunk, 1993; Hofstetter, 1973; Wesley and 
Summerlee, 2013; Campbell, 2006; 
Johnston, Matthews, andBittner, 2007; 
Pancheco, 2008; Pattie and Johnston, 
2005).  Previous research finds grounding 
in Downs’s Economic Theory of Democracy 
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(1957), which posits that voting is 
typically an irrational act, particularly in 
elections where one’s vote has little 
chance of affecting the outcome.  In cases 
where election results appear pre-
ordained, citizens may feel like their votes 
do not matter or do not make a difference, 
and they may opt to stay home on 
election day as a result (Schattschneider, 
1960; Key, 1955; Kenney and Rice, 1985; 
Rasmussen, 1966: 527-528).  At the same 
time, close elections are also likely to 
draw the attention and resources of 
political parties and elites, thus increasing 





We have taken a multi-pronged 
approach to measuring the 
competitiveness of each party system.   In 
single-memberplurality systems, the 
“margin of victory” in the election, itself, 
is the most straightforward measure of 
closeness (Blais and Lago, 2009: 95; 
Franklin, 2004: 57; Brown and Bruce, 
2002: 643).  This assumes the electorate 
approaches the campaign prospectively 
(versus retrospectively); drawing on 
available opinion polls and media 
coverage, voters would have a sense of 
whether that election was going to be 
close or not.  The greater the distance 
between the first- and second-place 
parties in terms of the popular vote, the 
more predictable the outcome (and the 
lower the turnout).    In this study, we also 
measure competitiveness using standard 
assessments of the number of parties in a 
system, and the relative concentration of 
votes among them.  A final dimension of 
closeness – government vulnerability – 
accounts for the likelihood of alternation 
in government.   This is also accounted for 
in our analysis, as we incorporate “change 
of government” as an independent 
variable in explaining voter turnout, 
recognizing again that this is an imperfect 
measure given the prospective/ 
retrospective dilemma.   
 Similarly, political scientists seem 
to be in consensus when it comes to the 
positive relationship between a polity’s 
“progressiveness” and its rate of voter 
turnout.  In this study, we employ two 
measures of “progressiveness”: the levels 
of left-wing support and unionization in a 
province.  (These two measures are in 
fact only weakly correlated (r = 0.390).)  
This definition is in keeping with the 
“power resources” of labour model, 
originally developed by Korpi (1974). The 
connection between turnout and 
unionization is well-established in the 
discipline.   Historically (at least), 
unionization has facilitated (at times, 
obliged) electoral participation, whether 
through education, solidarity, and/or 
active mobilization (Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady, 1995; Uhlaner, 1989; Radcliff 
and Davis, 2000).  Alongside left-wing 
parties, unions have tended to mobilize a 
larger proportion of an electorate’s 
‘working class’ population than have 
conservative parties and business 
associations (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; 
Alford, 1963; Gray and Caul, 2000; 
Leighley and Nagler, 1992).  In the 
absence of strong left-wing parties and 
unions, these individuals are often 
disengaged (but see Gallego, 2010; 
Fiorina, 1997).  At the same time, a 
stronger left-wing party presence tends 
to lead to greater polarization, thus 
encouraging those on both the left and the 
right to turn out (for fear that a loss on 
election day would lead to a noticeably 
disappointing set of policy outcomes) 
(Coate and Conlin, 2004).   Just as unions 
may ‘push’ their members to the ballot 
box, a wider variety of ideological options 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, 147-163 
150 
 
on the ballot (relative to “traditional”, 
centrifugal party systems) may ‘pull’ 
more voters to the polls (Crepaz, 1990).   
Data for this study was compiled 
from publicly-available sources.  Election 
results (including turnout and vote/seat 
totals) were drawn from official reports 
of the respective election authorities, and 
reported elsewhere (Wesley, 2010; 
Siaroff, 2015).   Demographic variables on 
population and family income are taken 
from Statistics Canada Census reports, 
except rural and small town population 
shares (see: Bollman and Clemenson, 




As illustrated in Table 1, voter 
turnout in the Canadian provinces has 
varied considerably both across 
jurisdictions and over time.  Overall, 
Prince Edward Island has had the highest 
turnout since 1965, with Alberta having 
had the lowest.  Indeed, Alberta (three 
times) and Ontario (once) are the only 
provinces where turnout in a given 
provincial election has been below 50 
percent. Since 1997, non-voting has 
continued to be most prevalent in Alberta, 
where average turnout in the most recent 
period stands at 50 percent. By contrast, 
an average of 82 percent of eligible voters 
cast ballots in Prince Edward Island (PEI).  
Indeed, by maintaining its high level of 
voter turnout throughout the past four 
decades, PEI stands as an exception to a 
general trend of steadily declining voter 
participation throughout most of Canada.  
What explains these differences? 
A range of independent variables 
were tested to account for this variance.  
The individual regressions of these 
independent variables on voter turnout 
are reported in Table 2, with descriptive 
statistics available from the authors.  Let 
us emphasize that the dependent variable 
is turnout across the 134 provincial 
elections, not the ten provinces. 
Our attention turns first to the 
context of the election, itself.  As 
discussed above, the year of the election 
clearly matters; as in federal elections, 
provincial voter turnout has dropped 
noticeably over time.  In this analysis we 
are measuring election years as a linear 
trend, however there is an argument for 
viewing distinctive breakpoints. 
Besides the year, the timing of an 
election might also be considered 
relevant.  Previous research on Canadian 
federal and provincial campaigns has 
suggested that turnout is lower in winter 
elections (Studlar, 2001: 310).  In our 
analysis however, although both “off 
season” variables (summer and winter) 
do have a negative effect on turnout, 
neither relationship is significant, either 
alone or in a multiple regression.  This is 
likely due to their very small frequencies 
— only five provincial elections were held 
in winter, and three in summer, out of 
134 elections in total.1   
A wide range of variables 
concerning electoral and legislative 
concentration, fragmentation, 
competition, and bias were also 
assessed. 2   According to this analysis, 
turnout is indeed lower in elections 
featuring more fragmented, as opposed to 
two-party, competition (in terms of votes 
or seats).    Results are less conclusive in 
terms of inter-party competition. One 
party winning a seat landslide does not 
affect turnout significantly, but a party 
having a large vote lead over the second-
largest party certainly does.  This likely 
reflects the fact that, in provincial 
elections, opinions polls would show the 
latter factor in advance, while few 
projections would be offered by way of  
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seat distributions threehundredeight.com 
notwithstanding).  
Alternatively, turnout is affected 
by “vote domination” – the interaction of 
the vote share of the largest party and its 
vote lead. Polarization is assessed as a 
dummy variable, where the system is 
polarized when the top two parties – one 
of which is the NDP or PQ – have 90 
percent or more of the vote between 
them; this is not significant by itself.  
Hung parliaments (of which there have 
been fourteen) do not relate to voter 
turnout, but an election resulting in a 
change of government certainly does.  
Finally, there is no relationship between 
disproportionality overall or the specific 
bias in favour of the lead party and 
turnout.
 








Mean Turnout    
(Ranking out of 10) 
 
British Columbia 55.1% (2009) 77.7% (1983) 68.6%  (7) 
Alberta 40.6% (2008) 72.0% (1971) 56.1% (10) 
Saskatchewan 64.6% (1995) 83.9% (1982) 76.1%  (2) 
Manitoba 54.2% (2003) 78.3% (1973) 66.9%  (8) 
Ontario 49.2% (2011) 73.5% (1971) 60.8%  (9) 
Quebec 57.4% (2008) 85.3% (1976) 75.8%  (3) 
New Brunswick 65.4% (2014) 82.1% (1967) 75.5%  (4) 
Nova Scotia 58.0% (2009) 78.2% (1978) 70.3%  (6) 
Prince Edward Island 76.4% (2011) 87.6% (1986) 83.3%  (1) 
Newfoundland & 
Labrador 
57.7% (2011) 87.9% (1971) 73.0%  (5) 
All 40.6% (AB 2008) 87.9% (Nfld. 1971) 70.7% 
 
Several demographic measures 
were also assessed as part of this 
analysis:  size of population (also as a 
logged measure), rural and rural/small 
town population share, the percentage of 
the population born in the province, the 
aboriginal share of the population, the 
share of the population whose mother 
tongue is a non-official language, the 
mean family income in the province, and 
the median age in the province.3    All of 
these demographic variables have 
significant impacts on voter turnout.  The 
most substantive and surprising effect is 
that of mean family income, which 
explains 35 percent of the total variance 
by itself.  Contrary to theories that 
suggest a positive relationship with 
turnout, however, our findings suggest 
mean family income has a negative effect 
on voter participation.  In other words, 
provinces with higher average family 
incomes tended to feature lower rates of 
turnout.   This finding emerges as a result 
of low voter turnout in the three 
relatively prosperous provinces of 
Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario; 
however, one cannot assume causality 
here, as these are also the provinces that 
(along with Quebec) are the most 
populated and the least rural.  Alberta, BC, 
and Ontario also have the smallest share 
of their populations born in-province, due 
to relatively high immigration and 
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interprovincial migration.  (Wealth is 
quite likely an antecedent factor.)   
Further analysis is required to determine 
the precise source of this relationship, 
including an assessment of the role of 
provincial GDP in the causal equation.4 
Lastly, we also assessed a couple of 
measures of progressivism: the left-wing 
vote in an election (with the NDP, the PQ, 
and Québec Solidaire classified as left-
wing parties), and the level of 
unionization (and thus potential working 
class mobilization).  Only the unionization 
rate was significant in a bivariate 
regression. 
In terms of a multiple regression of 
the independent variables, initially let us 
focus just on the election-specific effects 
that shape turnout.  Table 3a combines 
the six variables here that are the most 
relevant in a multivariate analysis.  These 
reflect aspects of a clear choice and a 
biased outcome.  First is two-party vote 
concentration, with turnout being higher 
the more the competition (measured by 
vote spread) is focused between two 
parties as opposed to being multiparty.  
However, turnout is even higher where is 
the competition is most evenly-balanced 
between the two parties.  In other words, 
to the extent that there is one party that is 
highly dominant (with a large vote lead 
over the second largest party), this will 
lower turnout.  Third, if indeed the 
election reflects multiparty competition 
in that more than two parties each win 
two or more seats, this will decrease 
turnout by almost five percentage points 
(in this model) compared with a non-
multiparty system.  Fourth, turnout is 
much higher in elections that produce a 
change of government — in this model, by 
over five percentage points compared to 
when this does not occur.  Fifth and 
finally in terms of election-specific effects, 
in this multivariate model turnout is 
higher the greater the disproportionality.  
This finding goes against the general view 
that proportionality, or more precisely 
proportional representation electoral 
systems, have higher turnout due to more 
choice, a fairer outcome, and so on.  
Instead, it appears that in Canadian 
provincial elections, disproportionality 
translates as the decisiveness of the 
outcome, and voter turnout correlates 
positively with this.  This counter-
intuitive finding suggests that when 
voters visit the polls at higher rates, it 
tends to coincide with disproportionate 
results and often decisive victories for the 
lead party. 5  Conversely, elections that 
feature greater alignment between 
parties’ share of the popular vote and 
legislative seats tend to feature lower 
levels of voter participation.  In short, 
turnout would be lowest in a multiparty 
outcome without (or with little) electoral 
bias, and highest in the opposite scenario. 
That said, these five election-
specific variables explain barely one-third 
of the variance in turnout among 
Canadian provincial elections.  Adding 
key broader provincial contextual 
variables allows us to explain fully 70 
percent the variation, as is shown in Table 
4.  Interestingly, in this broader model 
two-party vote concentration is no longer 
a significant predictor.  The other four 
election-specific variables remain 
relevant, however.  To these we add the 
election year, reflecting the ongoing drop 
in turnout over time.  We also add three 
aspects of provincial demographics.  As 
noted, turnout is higher where the 
province is more rural and where the 
province has a greater percentage of the 
population born there (and thus more 
“rooted”), and lower where the Aboriginal 
share of the population is higher.  These 
patterns all remain substantive in this 
multivariate model.  Lastly, turnout is 
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higher the greater the level of each of the 
two different aspects of power resources: 
left-wing vote share and rate of 
unionization.   
It is worth emphasizing that 
turnout is higher in provinces with more 
“embedded” electorates, whether 
measured in terms of a high rural 
population share or proportion of the 
population born in the province.  The 
latter contextual finding reinforces 
previous research that linked local 
community integration to voter 
participation through the importance of 
social capital (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008; 
Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck, 2006).   
Communities with a lower proportion of 
longer-term residents are more likely to 
feature lower levels of voter engagement, 
as mobility tends to disrupt its members’ 
sense of “social connectedness – that 
network of family, work, and friendship 
groups that lowers information costs and 
rewards good citizenship”  (Gimpel 1999: 
332) (see also Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993: 23-24).  Provinces with higher 
proportions of Aboriginal peoples feature 
lower rates of turnout.  
Finally, Table 4 illustrates how 
each of the factors that are relevant in the 
multivariate analysis vary across the 
provinces.  Multiparty dynamics in terms 
of seats won have never occurred in 
Prince Edward Island, almost never in 
New Brunswick, and rarely in 
Saskatchewan and Newfoundland; yet 
they have been ongoing in Ontario and 
almost always present in Nova Scotia. 
Margins of victory have been largest in 
Alberta and Newfoundland, and lowest in 
Manitoba — the least and most 
competitive provinces by this measure, 
respectively.   
By the same token, post-election 
changes in government have been most 
common in Quebec (the only province 
where these have occurred over half the 
time) followed by New Brunswick and 
Nova Scotia, and least common in Alberta 
(only once) and Newfoundland (three 
times).  Prince Edward Island is the most 
rural of all Canadian provinces (with the 
majority of the population living outside 
urban areas), followed by the other 
Atlantic Provinces and Saskatchewan; not 
surprisingly, Ontario and the three next 
largest provinces are the most urban.   
The share of the population born 
in-province has been highest in 
Newfoundland followed by Quebec, and 
lowest in British Columbia followed by 
Alberta and Ontario.  The Aboriginal 
share of the population has been highest 
in Saskatchewan and Manitoba and 
lowest in Prince Edward Island.  Finally, 
in terms of the power resources of labour, 
the left-wing share of the vote has beeen 
highest in Saskatchewan, British 
Columbia, Manitoba, and Quebec, and 
lowest in Prince Edward Island, and the 
rate of unionization has been highest in 
British Columbia, Newfoundland, Quebec, 
and Manitoba, and lowest in Alberta and 
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year of election -0.314 0.055 -5.695 0.000 0.191 
winter election dummy variable -1.369 4.694 -0.292 0.771 -0.007 
summer election dummy variable -0.853 6.015 -0.142 0.887 -0.007 
seats in legislature -0.122 0.029 -4.227 0.000 0.113 
ENPP -4.201 2.018 -2.081 0.039 0.024 
number of parties with at least two seats -7.205 1.291 -5.580 0.000 0.185 
multiparty system dummy * -9.332 1.586 -5.885 0.000 0.202 
two-party system dummy 8.254 1.628 5.069 0.000 0.157 
one-party seat concentration 0.060 0.062 0.962 0.338 -0.001 
one-party vote concentration 0.262 0.128 2.043 0.043 0.023 
two-party seat concentration 0.454 0.116 3.920 0.000 0.097 
two-party vote concentration 0.507 0.085 5.973 0.000 0.207 
seat lead largest party by seats over second 
largest 0.001 0.034 0.017 0.987 -0.008 
vote lead largest party by seats over second 
largest -0.189 0.086 -2.195 0.030 0.028 
vote domination of largest party by votes (vote 
share x lead) -0.260 0.141 -1.842 0.068 0.018 
polarization with 90 percent of the vote dummy 
variable 6.024 3.346 1.800 0.074 0.017 
hung parliament dummy variable -2.824 2.899 -1.974 0.332 0.000 
post-election change of government dummy 
variable 5.733 1.807 3.173 0.002 0.064 
disproportionality -0.012 0.098 -0.125 0.901 -0.007 
seat bias lead party 0.000 0.093 -0.003 0.998 -0.008 
population (thousands) -0.001 0.000 -4.664 0.000 0.135 
population logged -9.389 1.416 -6.633 0.000 0.244 
rural population share 0.419 0.051 8.277 0.000 0.337 
rural and small town population share 0.377 0.056 6.760 0.000 0.252 
share of population born in province 0.394 0.056 6.996 0.000 0.265 
aboriginal share of the population -1.070 0.262 -4.090 0.000 0.106 
non-official language mother tongue share of 
the population -0.595 0.085 -6.986 0.000 0.264 
mean family income (as ratio of Canadian 
value) -0.477 0.057 -8.363 0.000 0.341 
left-wing share of the vote -0.101 0.055 -1.829 0.070 0.017 
unionization rate 0.337 0.155 2.184 0.031 0.028 
power resources (interaction of previous two 
variables) -0.146 0.148 -0.987 0.326 0.000 
age ratio versus Canada as a whole -0.143 0.146 -0.974 0.332 0.000 
* three or more parties each with at least two seats 
n=134 









t signif.  
level 
two-party vote concentration 0.376 0.115 3.270 0.001 
vote domination of largest party by votes (vote 
share x lead) -0.484 0.149 -3.240 0.002 
multiparty system dummy -4.269 2.140 -1.995 0.048 
post-election change of government dummy 
variable 5.117 1.542 3.358 0.001 
disproportionality 0.219 0.102 2.138 0.034 
constant 38.082 10.918 3.488 0.001 
adjusted r2 = 0.336 
n=134 
 





t signif.  
level 
vote domination of largest party by votes (vote 
share x lead) -0.329 0.106 -3.101 0.002 
multiparty system dummy -5.036 1.104 -4.560 0.000 
post-election change of government dummy 
variable 3.821 1.042 3.669 0.000 
disproportionality 0.202 0.070 2.894 0.005 
year of election -0.208 0.037 -5.682 0.000 
rural population share 0.266 0.051 5.218 0.000 
share of population born in province 0.182 0.048 3.779 0.000 
aboriginal share of the population -0.628 0.195 -3.219 0.002 
left-wing share of the vote 0.123 0.046 2.660 0.009 
unionization rate 0.289 0.102 2.845 0.005 
constant 449.426 72.586 6.192 0.000 
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Table 4.  Provincial Variations on Relevant Variables 
A)  Multiparty System Dummy     
      





Newfoundland & Labrador 14 4 10   
Prince Edward Island 14 0 14   
Nova Scotia 14 12 2   
New Brunswick 13 1 12   
Quebec 14 9 5   
Ontario 14 14 0   
Manitoba 13 8 5   
Saskatchewan 12 3 9   
Alberta 13 8 5   
British Columbia 13 5 8   
 
 
     
B)  Margin of Victory in the Popular Vote (1st Place over 2nd Place) 
      
 N mean standard 
dev. 
minimum maximum 
Newfoundland & Labrador 14 18.4 13.0 0.4 48.4 
Prince Edward Island 14 11.2 7.2 1.0 24.9 
Nova Scotia 14 10.0 6.5 0.7 19.3 
New Brunswick 13 10.0 10.3 0.0 31.8 
Quebec 14 9.4 7.8 0.4 24.5 
Ontario 14 9.1 5.7 0.9 21.6 
Manitoba 13 6.5 4.1 0.9 13.2 
Saskatchewan 12 11.6 9.3 0.6 32.2 
Alberta 13 23.0 13.0 4.8 44.5 
British Columbia 13 8.9 8.5 2.2 36.0 
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C)  Change of Government Dummy  
      





Newfoundland & Labrador 14 3 11   
Prince Edward Island 14 5 9   
Nova Scotia 14 6 8   
New Brunswick 13 6 7   
Quebec 14 8 6   
Ontario 14 4 10   
Manitoba 13 5 8   
Saskatchewan 12 4 8   
Alberta 13 1 12   
British Columbia 13 4 9   
      
      
(D)  Disproportionality      
      
 N mean standard 
dev. 
minimum maximum 
Newfoundland 14 17.7 6.4 3.2 31.1 
Prince Edward Island 14 23.1 12.2 2.4 41.8 
Nova Scotia 14 17.1 9.1 3.2 34.2 
New Brunswick 13 18.7 12.2 2.5 39.6 
Quebec 14 19.3 6.9 7.7 38.0 
Ontario 14 15.7 6.7 5.1 25.8 
Manitoba 13 13.9 3.5 5.5 19.0 
Saskatchewan 12 20.9 6.3 13.7 32.3 
Alberta 13 27.9 6.4 16.9 40.0 
British Columbia 13 18.3 8.8 6.2 39.9 
      
      
(E)  Rural Population      
      
 N mean standard 
dev. 
minimum maximum 
Newfoundland & Labrador 14 42.4 1.6 40 46 
Prince Edward Island 14 59.6 3.9 53 64 
Nova Scotia 14 44.2 1.2 42 46 
New Brunswick 13 48.7 2.1 44 52 
Quebec 14 20.7 1.1 19 22 
Ontario 14 17.1 1.9 14 20 
Manitoba 13 29.2 1.7 28 33 
Saskatchewan 12 40.0 5.1 33 50 
Alberta 13 21.8 3.7 17 30 
British Columbia 13 19.8 3.9 14 25 
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(F) Population Born in Province     
      
 N mean standard 
dev. 
minimum maximum 
      
Newfoundland & Labrador 14 93.8 1.1 92 96 
Prince Edward Island 14 80.2 3.5 74 87 
Nova Scotia 14 79.9 2.7 75 84 
New Brunswick 13 82.7 1.8 79 86 
Quebec 14 86.1 2.0 83 88 
Ontario 14 65.0 2.3 61 68 
Manitoba 13 72.4 1.3 70 74 
Saskatchewan 12 79.3 2.1 75 82 
Alberta 13 56.8 2.6 52 62 
British Columbia 13 47.8 0.7 47 49 
 
(G) Aboriginal Share of the Population 
    
      
 N mean standard 
dev. 
minimum maximum 
Newfoundland & Labrador 14 2.2 3.0 0 10 
Prince Edward Island 14 0.6 1.2 0 4 
Nova Scotia 14 1.6 1.1 1 4 
New Brunswick 13 1.5 0.7 1 3 
Quebec 14 1.1 0.3 1 2 
Ontario 14 1.3 0.5 1 2 
Manitoba 13 8.1 4.8 4 20 
Saskatchewan 12 8.5 5.2 4 21 
Alberta 13 4.3 3.0 2 12 
British Columbia 13 2.8 1.3 2 6 
 
(H) Left-Wing Share of the Vote 
    
      
 N mean standard 
dev. 
minimum Maximum 
Newfoundland & Labrador 14 7.0 6.0 0.2 24.6 
Prince Edward Island 14 3.3 2.7 0.0 8.4 
Nova Scotia 14 22.1 11.3 5.2 45.2 
New Brunswick 13 7.7 3.7 0.2 13.0 
Quebec 14 34.7 11.6 0.0 49.2 
Ontario 14 23.5 6.1 12.6 37.6 
Manitoba 13 38.8 8.7 23.1 49.4 
Saskatchewan 12 43.4 6.3 32.0 55.0 
Alberta 13 14.4 6.5 8.0 29.2 
British Columbia 13 38.8 6.0 21.6 46.0 
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(I) Unionization Rate 
      
 N mean standard 
dev. 
minimum Maximum 
Newfoundland & Labrador 14 38.4 4.5 29 45 
Prince Edward Island 14 27.9 5.4 14 33 
Nova Scotia 14 31.0 2.6 27 34 
New Brunswick 13 31.6 4.3 25 40 
Quebec 14 37.3 4.7 26 44 
Ontario 14 30.9 2.6 27 34 
Manitoba 13 35.1 2.2 31 38 
Saskatchewan 12 33.8 2.8 28 38 
Alberta 13 26.0 2.5 22 30 
British Columbia 13 38.8 4.8 31 44 
Examining, again, the two polar extremes 
of provincial voter turnout — Prince 
Edward Island and Alberta — largely 
confirms these overall findings.  Prince 
Edward Island has never had a multiparty 
system, has relatively competitive 
elections, has frequent changes of 
government (though not as many as 
Quebec), is the most rural province, has a 
large share of its population born in the 
province, and has the smallest Aboriginal 
share of the population.  (On the other 
hand, PEI has the smallest left-wing share 
of the vote and the second-lowest 
unionization rate.)   For its part, Alberta 
has had a multiparty system more often 
than not, clearly has the most lopsided 
elections in terms of vote margins, has 
had but a single change of government in 
the period under examination (1971, 
when the turnout peaked at 72 percent), 
has a low rural population share, has the 
second smallest share of the population 
born in the province, and has had a below 
average level of support for the political 
left and the lowest level of unionization of 
the provinces.  In these two extreme cases 
– as reflected in the multivariate 
regression analysis – competitiveness, 
‘embeddedness’, and progressiveness all 
emerge as important factors in explaining 
voter turnout in the Canadian provinces.  
Looking forwards, provincial 
competitiveness could certainly change 
and progressiveness possibly so, but 
‘embeddedness’ (or local attachment) 
arises from demographic features that are 
quite constant.  Demographics by 
themselves, then, mean that Alberta 
cannot be “made into” Prince Edward 
Island as a means of, say, increasing voter 
turnout in Alberta.  
Implications 
 
Decades of survey research have 
confirmed the strength of individual-level 
attitudinal and socio-demographic 
determinants of voter turnout.   Missing 
from many accounts is the sense that 
“context matters” in determining rates of 
political participation.  Following in the 
ecological analysis tradition, the results of 
the present study confirm three 
additional, core determinants of voter 
turnout in the Canadian provinces:  (1) 
the competitiveness of their elections;  (2) 
the “embeddedness” of their populations; 
and (3) the “progressiveness” of their 
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electorates.  Provinces with more closely 
contested campaigns (i.e., with tighter, 
two-party contests) tend to feature higher 
rates of voter turnout.  So, too, do 
provinces where the population is more 
“rooted”, being more rural and more born 
in the province.  Lastly, provinces with 
stronger left-wing parties and higher 
rates of unionization also have higher 
turnout.  These findings appear to be in 
part the product of the fact that more 
competitive provincial elections tend to 
feature stronger left-wing parties and 
higher rates of unionization. This is 
consistent with theories based in rational 
choice and public choice traditions, and 
serve as a useful foundation for further 
comparative research on voter turnout in 
Canada.  Returning to demographics, we 
found that overall wealth of a province in 
terms of average family income is not a 
relevant explanatory factor, but rural 
population share, the share of the 
population born in the province, and the 
Aboriginal population share all are.  Each 
of these factors speaks to the level of 
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Endnotes 
 
1 For season of election, winter is defined as 
December, January, and February, and summer as 
July and August. 
2 For information, the number of seats in a legislature 
was found to have no significant effect on turnout. 
3 For both mean family income and median age, to be 
consistent over time the value is always determined 
as a ratio with the value for Canada as a whole in a 
given year set to 100. 
4 Research by Huckfeldt (1979) and Giles and Dantico 
(1982) may be helpful, as they suggest low-income 
individuals in high-income communities are less 
likely to vote than their more affluent neighbours.  
5 Indeed, in Canadian provincial elections 
disproportionality is almost exclusively a matter of 
seat bias in favour of the lead party (r. = 0.983), and 
using this alternative measure produces essentially 
the same multiple regression.  
